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ABSTRACT 
Thorstein Veblen asked in 1898 why economics is not an evolutionary science; he proposed a 
Darwinian paradigm shift for economics. Among the implications reviewed here, was his 
claim that Darwinian principles applied to social entities as well as to biological phenomena. 
It is also argued that economists have additional reasons for taking Darwinian evolution 
seriously. Recent work on the evolution of altruism, cooperation and morality show that we 
are on the brink of developing an evolutionary-grounded theory of human motivation that 
breaks from the selfish utility-maximizer lambasted by Veblen. This new theory accepts a 
biological as well as a cultural foundation for moral dispositions. As noted here, the neglected 
British institutional economist John A. Hobson – who was an acquaintance of Veblen – 
foreshadowed this approach.  
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It is a very great honor to receive this award. I feel incredibly fortunate to follow Clarence E. 
Ayres, Morris A. Copeland, Gunnar Myrdal, John Kenneth Galbraith, Adolf Lowe, Robert 
Heilbroner, Hyman P. Minsky, Richard R. Nelson, and many other inspirational economists. I 
wish to thank most deeply everyone involved in this decision.  
I am also pleased to receive this award in Chicago. The University of Chicago is 
historically important for its institutionalism as well as its monetarism. As Malcolm 
Rutherford (2011: 125) puts it in his excellent history: “Chicago has a strong claim to be seen 
both as the birthplace of what became to be known as institutional economics and a place 
from which institutionalism spread to other institutions.”  
My academic contribution is tiny, but it would be neither gracious nor diplomatic for me to 
question in public the wisdom of choosing me for this award. I will suspend my critical 
faculties and quickly pass on to another feature of this choice. Among the 42 illustrious 
previous recipients of this award, only three were born outside of North America. They are 
Adolf Lowe (born in Germany), Gunnar Myrdal (born in Sweden), and my friend Geoffrey 
Harcourt (born in Australia). That makes me the third European. I am pleased to increase my 
continental quota by 50 per cent. I thank the nominating committee for its wider vision. I look 
forward to the first winners from Asia, Africa or Latin America, and to more women 
recipients than the two so far.  
You may wonder, with Europe in its current mess, what can it teach Americans about 
economics? Europeans are making many mistakes. If European politicians had considered 
more closely the chartalist or state-theory of money while setting up the European single 
currency in the 1990s, then they would have understood more clearly that the Eurozone would 
not work unless it entailed a much stronger fiscal and political union, with a much stronger 
European Central Bank. They would have either abandoned the planned Euro or put in place 
the required federal institutions to avoid the crisis that we are in now.  
So can we learn anything from European institutions and policies? According to the United 
Nations Human Development Report for 2009, within the 22 most highly developed 
countries, those four globally with the lowest income inequality were Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden.
1
 It is in the Scandinavian homeland of Myrdal and of the parents of 
Thorstein Veblen that inequality is at its lowest in the developed world and the welfare state is 
most highly developed.  
Having pleaded that Europe is not all bad, I turn to some ideas from that man of Norwegian 
descent. Veblen (1898a) asked “why is economics not an evolutionary science?” This prize is 
awarded by the Association for Evolutionary Economics. In the remainder of my talk I 
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consider how evolution can inform our understanding of human motivation and help 
transform economics. 
Economics as an evolutionary science 
Americans have a problem with evolution. A 2005 Gallup poll of Americans found that 53 
per cent expressed their belief that God created human beings “exactly in the way the Bible 
describes it,” with 65 per cent sympathetic to creationism (Wikipedia 2011).  
In Europe our evolution from ape-like ancestors is much more widely accepted. Another 
report found that more than 70 per cent of respondents in Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Sweden, UK, and other countries agreed that humans had evolved from earlier species 
of animals. For the US the quoted figure was 40 per cent, and falling (Hecht 2006).  
But “evolutionary economics” means much more than an acceptance of human evolution. It 
means an emphasis on change, and on technology as one of the main drivers of economic 
development. In addition, when Veblen proposed that economics should be an evolutionary 
science, he specifically mentioned the role of Darwinism.   
For Veblen (1908d: 399-400), Darwinism involved the rejection of teleological reasoning 
in favor of a detailed analysis of cause and effect. Accordingly, Veblen followed pragmatist 
philosophers such as William James and John Dewey in rejecting explanations of human 
conduct based on reason and deliberation alone. These too had to be explained, and this was 
partly through the psychological concept of habit. As Darwin wrote in 1856: “Men are called 
„creatures of reason,‟ more appropriately they would be „creatures of habit‟” (Darwin 1974: 
84, 115). As Charles Sanders Peirce (1878, p. 294) declared, the “essence of belief is the 
establishment of habit.” Accordingly, Veblen (1907, p. 308) saw the critical implications of 
Darwinism for a theory of mind and behavior: 
Under the Darwinian norm it must be held that men‟s reasoning is largely controlled by 
other than logical, intellectual forces … opinion is as much, or more, a matter of 
sentiment than of logical inference; and that the sentiment which animates men … is as 
much, or more, an outcome of habit and native propensity as of calculated material 
interest. 
For Veblen this implied a critique of the theory of human motivation in both Marxism and 
neoclassical economics.  
For Veblen the core Darwinian principles of variation, selection and information 
inheritance apply to social entities as well as to biological evolution (Aldrich et al. 2008, 
Hodgson and Knudsen 2010). Hence Veblen wrote several times of the Darwinian “natural 
selection” of habits and institutions (Camic and Hodgson 2011: 226, 238, 251, 260, 264, 296) 
and more often simply of their “selection” in a Darwinian sense. Darwinism provided an 
analytical framework for understanding cultural and institutional change.  
Veblen also contributed to our understanding of human motivation through his concept of 
instinct. Veblen (1914: 1-2) himself noted that the word was becoming unpopular. But for a 
long time many of his fellow-institutionalists went much further, to reject the concept of 
instinct in its entirety (Hodgson 2004).  
That goes too far. Human behavior must have biological as well as cultural foundations. 
Veblen (1914: 2-3, 13) saw instincts as “innate and persistent … propensities” and “hereditary 
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traits.” He went on to explain how they guided habit-formation, and how they could be 
diverted, or even negated, in a specific cultural and institutional context. 
Veblen‟s perspective is remarkably relevant and modern. A large number of recent studies 
indicate that human phenomena such as language, altruism, cooperation and morality have 
partly a genetic foundation (Field 2001, 2007, Hammerstein 2003, Joyce 2006, Bowles and 
Gintis 2011, Hodgson 2012). While there is also a much cruder literature that attempts to 
explain human behavior entirely in biological terms, the more sophisticated and persuasive 
accounts reject biological reductionism. Culture and acquired habit do the lion‟s share of 
explanation. But instinctive dispositions are essential to appreciate the Darwinian chain of 
cause and effect. The origins of cultural phenomena cannot themselves be explained entirely 
in cultural terms. This would be to assume that which has to be explained.  
The evolution of moral motivation 
Instinctive dispositions help us to form habits. Among these are habits of thought concerning 
morality. Against the hedonism of the economics textbooks, human beings are constantly 
asking themselves: “what is the right thing to do?” The concept of habit in general, and moral 
habits in particular, constitute a major challenge to the neoclassical approach to human 
motivation. I have written elsewhere on the concept of habit (Hodgson 2004, 2006, 2010). I 
now address morality.  
An adequate understanding of institutions must acknowledge moral as well as self-
regarding motivations. Moral motivations were emphasized by members of the German 
historical school (Koslowski 1995, 1997) and acknowledged by original institutionalists such 
as Veblen and Commons. But these two institutionalists lacked a developed theory of 
morality that could dovetail into an analysis of how institutions work. Other institutionalists 
such as Clarence Ayres (1918) and J. Fagg Foster (1981), wrote much on ethics and values, 
but their concern was more to establish principles of policy evaluation and less to explain 
human motivation. Much worse, the concept of morality plays no significant role in the new 
institutional economics. Instead Oliver Williamson (1975) makes opportunism the star of the 
show.  
We need first to consider the nature of a moral judgment, without necessarily establishing 
what is morally right or correct. We address descriptive rather than normative ethics. 
Philosophers such as John L. Mackie (1977: 33) and Richard Joyce (2006: 70) establish that 
moral judgments are inescapable, thus surpassing matters of convenience or preference. 
Morals are more than mere conventions. They are more about “doing the right thing” than 
satisfying one‟s tastes.  
Research has shown that humans cooperate and act altruistically at a much higher 
frequency than that predicted by neoclassical economists (Field 2001, 2007, Hammerstein 
2003, Bowles and Gintis 2011). But this literature generally conflates altruism or cooperation 
with morality. When we cooperate by driving on the same side of the road as others, our 
prime motivation is survival rather than morality. Being altruistic to close relatives is not 
necessarily evidence of moral inclusiveness or universality. Morality is a different matter.  
Veblen (1898b: 188) argued that assumptions about human nature should be consistent with 
our understanding of human evolution through Darwinian natural selection. In 1871, William 
Stanley Jevons (1871) and Carl Menger (1871) proclaimed self-interested economic man as 
the foundation of economic thinking. Darwin published an evolutionary refutation of this core 
assumption in the very same year. In Darwin‟s (1871) account, morality results from a 
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combination of emotional impulses and thoughtful deliberation. He argued that although 
primitive moral feelings have evolved for millions of years among “the progenitors of man” 
(1871, vol. 1: 88-89), humans alone have a fully developed sense of morality:  
A moral being is one who is capable of comparing his past and future actions or motives, 
and of approving or disapproving of them. We have no reason to suppose that any of the 
lower animals have this capacity … man … alone can with certainty be ranked as a moral 
being … 
Darwin considered dispositions such as “sympathy, fidelity, and courage” that would 
advantage one tribe against another in a struggle for existence. Darwin (1871, vol. 1: 162-166) 
wrote: 
Selfish and contentious people will not cohere, and without coherence nothing can be 
effected ... although a high standard of morality gives but a slight or no advantage to each 
individual man … over the other men of the same tribe … an advancement in the 
standard of morality … will certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe over 
another … a tribe including many members who … were always ready to give aid to 
each other and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over 
most other tribes; and this would be natural selection. 
Hence groups with members that devote themselves to the interests of their group will have an 
advantage in the struggle for survival. Darwin‟s evolutionary explanation of moral sentiments 
relies on group selection, where individual traits that benefit the group are assumed to prosper 
automatically. Darwin did not counter the objection that selfish individuals would be able to 
free-ride within an altruistic group, and eventually out-breed the unselfish (Williams 1966, 
Dawkins 1976). Before it was shown how free-riding could be contained, and the theory of 
group selection was rehabilitated (Wilson and Sober 1994, Sober and Wilson 1998), Darwin‟s 




As Darwin insisted, morality itself relies on sophisticated deliberation, and this could not 
have emerged among humans prior to language, which probably became adequate for the task 
very roughly 100,000 years ago (Oppenheimer 2004). All except Biblical fundamentalists will 
agree that this is very recent in human evolution.  
The centrality of linguistic deliberation means that the evolution of morality is much about 
culture as well as genes. Genes provide the basic impulses while culture builds upon them 
(Hauser 2006). The basic impulses may be a result of longstanding genetic selection among 
closely-related kin (Hamilton 1964). When a language-based culture gets established, cultural 
group selection does the evolutionary work (Boyd and Richerson 1985, Henrich 2004, 
Hodgson 2012). 
Moral motivation and European economics 
Discussion of moral motivation in economics is rare. Yet in the opening sentence of his 
Theory of Moral Sentiments of 1759, Adam Smith (1976: 9) wrote of “principles in [man‟s] 
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to 
him.” Smith (1976: 158-9) further wrote:  
Nature … has not … abandoned us entirely to the delusions of self-love. Our continual 
observations upon the conduct of others, insensibly lead us to form to ourselves certain 
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general rules concerning what is fit and proper to be done or to be avoided … It is thus 
that the general rules of morality are formed.  
In England John Ruskin (1866, p. 17) attacked the idea that the social affections “are 
accidental and disturbing elements in human nature; but avarice and the desire of progress are 
constant elements.”  
Influenced by both John Ruskin and the German historical school, the neglected English 
economist John A. Hobson placed moral issues at the center of his understanding of both 
human motivation and economic policy. (Incidentally, Hobson‟s birthplace in 1858 in Derby 
in the English Midlands is only 36 miles from my home, and his surname is similar to mine. 
One wonders perhaps if my award is a clerical error.) With Albert F. Mummery, Hobson 
invented the term “unemployment” and provided a proto-Keynesian analysis of its causes 
(Mummery and Hobson 1889, Hobson 1896). Hobson (1902) inspired Lenin on imperialism. 
Hobson (1936) met Veblen and published a book on him. But his contribution to our 
understanding of morality in economics is less known.  
Hobson (1921: 132) wrote of the “importance of retaining in moral and political philosophy 
the clear recognition that we are dealing with conduct which continues ever to be directed by 
biological considerations of survival” because “only thus can we grasp the substance and 
vitality of ideals.” If instead we regard ideals “as pure products of rational consciousness, of a 
moral and intellectual nature supervening upon our animal inheritance, it is easy ... to dismiss 
them as illusions or shadowy epiphenomena.” 
Hobson (1929: 13) argued that it would be better to “search for values not in the high 
abstractions of philosophic thought but in the lower levels of human nature – the instincts, 
appetites, and behaviour of the animal man.” This stress on the importance of the evolved 
biological foundations of human morality put Hobson on the side of Darwin on this subject.
3
 
In contrast, other Darwinians such as Thomas Henry Huxley saw evolution as separate from 
morality.
4




An illustration: economics and environmental policy 
Mainstream economists regard individual self-interest as the only solid foundation for policy. 
Moral values are regarded as superficial or transient. Thus Dieter Helm – a leading 
environmental economist and former UK government advisor – claims that values are 
generally “fragile” and “highly uncertain.” Overlooking the possibility that moral values have 
deep biological and cultural foundations, Helm (1991: ix) takes the view that moral values are 
ephemeral and have little to do with the “economic process.”  
This theme is taken up by mainstream economist Partha Dasgupta. Addressing 
environmental problems, Dasgupta (1991: 31) writes:  “I cannot think that it will do to look 
solemn and utter pious sentiments concerning our moral duty.” Discussions of moral values 
are thus removed from debates on environmental policy, in an appeal to self-interest alone. In 
the words of Hobson, moral values are treated as “illusions or shadowy epiphenomena.”  
Moral values and norms are either disregarded in the neoclassical approach, or they are 
subsumed under the utilitarian calculus of satisfaction-seeking individuals. Either way, their 
distinct motivational significance is overlooked. Money value is used as the principal 
incentive. It is assumed that everything – including moral and aesthetic values – can be given 
a price.  
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Neoclassical economists such as Dasgupta and Helm focus on pecuniary and other material 
incentives to get people to change their behavior. But pecuniary and moral incentives can be 
vital complements, and are not necessarily rivals.
6
 In some cases self-interest can be 
overridden by moral considerations. Moral discourse can help to educate people and alter 
their preferences. With an exclusive focus on pecuniary rewards, intrinsic motivations and 
moral concerns can be “crowded out” and undermined.7  
Surveys that ask people to value the outcome of a proposed environmental policy often find 
respondents with moral commitments rather than unalloyed self-interest. Mark Sagoff (1988, 
p. 62) reports survey evidence showing that  
respondents believe that environmental policy – for example the degree of pollution 
permitted in national parks – involves ethical, cultural, and aesthetic questions over 
which society must deliberate on the merits, and that this has nothing to do with pricing 
the satisfaction of preferences at the margin. 
Clive Spash (2000) points out that large numbers of respondents in willingness-to-pay surveys 
refrain from giving an environmental resource a monetary value on the grounds of ethical 
beliefs in their intrinsic, non-tradeable value. We may conclude that appeals to values such as 
fairness and cooperation, concern for other species, and the legacy for future human 




If economics can be made into an evolutionary science, then there is no better opportunity 
than now. Turning economics into an evolutionary science requires a great interdisciplinary 
effort, drawing not only on economics past and present, but also on history, psychology, 
biology, anthropology, philosophy and other disciplines.  
Evolutionary and institutional economists can appreciate the evolution of morality and 
insist on its place alongside self-interest in human motivation. Much of the recent literature 
undermines hedonistic notions previously lambasted by Veblen and other original 
institutionalists. Consideration of the evolution of morality, undermines the whole utility-
maximizing framework. It revolutionizes our understanding of individual motivation. 
Individualists rightly remind us that incentives are important. But an evolutionary theory of 
human motivation points to our inherited and enlargeable capacities to consider others and 
limit our greed. Policy-makers should not appeal to greed alone.  
There is no shortage of ethically-loaded issues. I have addressed environmental policy. A 
large part of the economy is devoted to caring services, where moral motivation is vital 
(Folbre 1995, Folbre and Nelson 2003, Jochimsen 2003). Developed economies spend much 
on health services; to rely here on informed self-interest is both unrealistic and corrosive 
(Hodgson 2008). There are many examples of moral irresponsibility in business, government, 
and the economics profession.
9
 Yet evidence suggests that moral motivation is vital for 
cooperation in the workplace (Minkler 2008, Lopes et al. 2009). If economics is not yet an 
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Endnotes 
1. United Nations Development Programme (2009). “Most highly developed” is defined here 
as a Human Development Index of 0.85 or above. 
2. It seems that some basic and universal moral dispositions, particularly concerning care for 
others, fairness, reciprocity, loyalty to the group, respect for tradition, and respect for 
authority, evolved genetically among closely-related kin (Haidt and Joseph 2004, 2007). Such 
dispositions are found to some degree in other primates (De Waal 1996). 
3, Hobson‟s insistence on the moral nature of economic discourse towers over his 
predecessors in the profession. And his appreciation of the evolutionary foundations of 
morality surpasses John Maynard Keynes (1933), Kenneth Boulding (1969) and Amartya Sen 
(1987), notwithstanding the importance of their later ethical contributions. 
4. In 1893 Huxley argued that “the ethical progress of society” depends on neither ignoring, 
accepting nor imitating natural selection in that sphere “but in combating it” (Huxley and 
Huxley 1947, p. 82). An admirer of Huxley was Ayres (1932). In contrast to Hobson, Ayres 
(1932: 96-97) opposed Darwin‟s (1871) account and its notion of social instincts, and 
supposed that “„moral feelings‟ are „acquired‟ in toto” through culture. Dismissing Darwin‟s 
Descent of Man (1871) as “an outmoded classic”, Ayres lauded Huxley‟s works as “exciting 
reading today”. Ayres (1932: 95) also saw Darwin‟s notions of natural selection and sexual 
selection as obsolete: “Darwin is very nearly, if not quite, as outmoded today as Lamarck.”  
5. Dawkins (1976: 3, 215) declared: “Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we 
are born selfish. … We, alone on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish 
replicators.” Echoing Huxley, evolution is said to make us selfish, but somehow inexplicably 
we can choose to be otherwise. The contrast with Darwin‟s (1871) views on human nature 
and morality are graphic.  
6. As Elinor Ostrom (1990) and Michael Taylor (1996) have pointed out, many cases of 
cooperation in modern societies depend on combinations of normative exhortations, peer 
pressure, incentives and sanctions.  
7. See Frey (1997), Ostrom (2000), Frey and Jegen (2001), Bowles (2008), Vollan (2008). 
8, Schkade and Payne (1994) showed that in environmental surveys moral considerations 
dominate matters of self-interest. Another overview concluded that responses concerning 
contingent valuation of the environment “are dominated by citizen judgments concerning 
desirable social goals rather than by consumer preferences” (Blamey et al. 1995, p. 285). 
9, Consider the evidence of moral irresponsibility and corruption prior to the Great Crash of 
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